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Abstract
There is a major housing affordability crisis in many American metropolitan areas,
particularly for renters. Minimum parking requirements in municipal zoning codes drive up the
price of housing, and thus represent an important potential for reform for local policymakers.
The relationship between parking and housing prices, however, remains poorly understood. We
use national American Housing Survey data and hedonic regression techniques to investigate this
relationship. We find that the cost of garage parking to renter households is approximately
$1,700 per year, or an additional 17% of a housing unit’s rent. In addition to the magnitude of
this transport cost burden being effectively hidden in housing prices, the lack of rental housing
without bundled parking imposes a steep cost on carless renters – commonly the lowest income
households – who may be paying for parking that they do not need or want. We estimate the
direct deadweight loss for carless renters to be $440 million annually. We conclude by
suggesting cities reduce or eliminate minimum parking requirements, and allow and encourage
landlords to unbundle parking costs from housing costs.
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Introduction
The United States is in the midst of a housing affordability crisis, particularly for urban
renters (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2015). Fast-rising housing prices, especially in coastal
metropolitan areas, have been attributed to restrictive land use regulations (Glaeser, Gyourko, &
Saks, 2005; Quigley & Raphael, 2005). Accordingly, minimum off-street parking requirements,
a central component of land use regulation in the United States, warrant detailed study and
potential policy reform. In most cities today, developers are required by municipal regulation to
provide on-site parking. As a result, the large majority of housing units include “bundled”
parking, which refers to parking spaces that are rented or sold in conjunction with a housing unit
(McDonnell, Madar, & Been, 2011). While many households might have chosen to pay for onsite parking in a free market, this proportion is surely significantly lower than what has been
mandated. Moreover, the historical effect of minimums and bundled parking effectively hides a
transport cost burden in housing prices, leaving households unable or unaware of their ability to
choose. Urban policymakers have thus taken an interest in reforming parking regulations and
allowing unbundled parking based on social equity and environmental sustainability rationales.
A major justification for parking-related policy changes is that existing requirements
unnecessarily drive up the price of housing. To date, there are no national estimates of the impact
of required parking provision on housing prices. Thus, we ask: what are the effects of parking
provision on residential rents in America’s cities?
To answer this question, we utilize a nationally representative sample of rental housing
units from the 2011 American Housing Survey (AHS). We first outline the existing state of
research and the policy rationale for reducing parking regulation, including the case for
unbundling parking costs from rental housing costs. We then focus our analysis on garage
3

parking, the costliest form of off-street parking (Shoup, 2014). We describe the prevalence of
bundled and garage parking across different types of households, housing units, and metropolitan
areas. We subsequently build hedonic regression models to estimate the effect of garage parking
on residential rents in U.S. metropolitan areas. We find that the cost of garage parking for renters
is approximately $1,700 per year, and the bundling of a garage space adds about 17% to a unit’s
rent. There are about 708,000 households without a car who have a garage parking space. Much
of this excess parking supply is due to municipal regulations, not consumer demand, and
represents a direct deadweight loss to society estimated to be approximately $440 million per
year. We argue, however, that this figure represents just the tip of the iceberg when considering
the indirect cost of minimum parking requirements. We conclude by suggesting two types of
local land use regulatory changes to reduce the high cost burden of parking: (1) cities should
reduce or eliminate minimum parking requirements, and (2) cities should allow or encourage
landlords to offer unbundled parking options.

Literature review
We analyze parking policy within the context of broader debates about the impact of land
use regulations on the housing affordability crisis taking place in many American cities. We then
describe the current state of American parking regulation and provision, and the case for
regulatory reform. Lastly, we examine empirical evidence showing minimum parking
requirements to be a binding constraint which increases housing prices.
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Land use regulations and housing affordability
The rise of housing supply limitations has been called “the most important transformation
that has happened in the American housing market since the development of the automobile”
(Glaeser et al., 2005, p. 20). The mechanisms through which land use regulations may limit
housing supply, and increase housing prices, include (1) directly or indirectly reducing density,
(2) imposing costly standards on developers, (3) shifting costs from the municipality to
developers, and (4) removing land from the developable supply (Deakin, 1989; Levine, 1999).
Parking regulation is most closely tied to the first two mechanisms. Minimum parking standards
reduce density if land that would otherwise be devoted to buildings is instead devoted to car
storage (Manville, 2013). This makes some infill development physically and/or financially
infeasible (Farris, 2001; Kennedy, 1995; Landis, Hood, Li, Rogers, & Warren, 2006). Minimum
parking requirements can also be very costly to real estate developers. Along with the
opportunity cost of devoting space to parking rather than other land uses, there is a high direct
cost of building new parking. Nationally, in 2012, the average cost to build one underground
parking space was $34,000 and to build an above-ground parking space was $24,000 (Shoup,
2014). These costs are ultimately passed on to the consumer, whether they have a car or not
(Shoup, 2005).

Regulations and the ubiquity of bundled parking
The spread of now-ubiquitous municipal parking regulations in the first part of the
twentieth century has been well-documented (see Shoup, 2005). Although regulatory approaches
vary somewhat by municipality and specific zoning designation, residential parking requirements
are commonly based on housing type (e.g., single-family, multi-family) and the size of the
5

housing unit (e.g., number of bedrooms) (McDonnell et al., 2011). Minimum parking standards
increased over time (Chester, Fraser, Matute, Flower, & Pendyala, 2015; Shoup, 2005). In Los
Angeles County, for example, between 1936 and 1960, the average apartment was required to
have one parking space and the typical single-family home was required to have two parking
spaces. After 1960, requirements for an average apartment increased to two spaces, and those for
single-family homes increased to three spaces (Chester et al., 2015).
Widespread minimum parking requirements have, not surprisingly, resulted in a limited
supply of housing options without dedicated parking. Housing without bundled parking has
emerged in three main ways. First, housing units built before the 1930s, before off-street parking
requirements were adopted as a municipal response to on-street parking shortages, often have no
on-site parking (Shoup, 2005). Second, for new housing developments, some cities – including
New York, San Francisco, Portland, and now Los Angeles — have recently reduced or
eliminated minimum parking requirements in downtowns or other neighborhoods (City of Los
Angeles, 2013; Millard-Ball, 2002). San Francisco has even banned the bundling of parking into
the monthly rent or sales price of a new housing unit (City of San Francisco, 2013). Third,
planning officials sometimes use their discretion to approve zoning variances for development
with less parking than required, but getting these variances approved is easier in certain cities
than others (Gabbe, 2016; Manville, Beata, & Shoup, 2013).
Given these limited scenarios, the prevalence of housing without parking is generally low
and varies considerably by city and metropolitan area. For example, about 95% of metropolitan
Los Angeles housing units include at least one parking space, while only 63% of those in
metropolitan New York City include one or more parking spaces (Manville et al., 2013).
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Comparing the two central cities reveals an even larger disparity: 90% of central Los Angeles
units but only 31% of central New York City units have parking.

The case for parking reform
Reforming parking standards is of great interest to planners, policymakers and developers
for several reasons. First, high parking requirements reinforce auto-oriented development
patterns, hindering cities’ sustainability goals (Manville et al., 2013). Second, the supply of
parking space necessitated by minimum standards exceeds the demand for parking in many
areas, resulting in inefficient land use (Shoup, 2005). Third – and the primary focus of this paper
– is that parking standards impose unnecessary costs on renters and buyers, particularly in
expensive housing markets (Manville et al., 2013). Ideally, consumers should have a choice as to
whether they buy or rent a parking space connected with a housing unit Parking spaces are not
necessary housing unit attributes, regulated for health or safety reasons, as are connections to
water or sewage service, for example (Shoup, 2005). Rather, parking spaces are residential
amenities, similar to on-site storage space, a dishwasher or air-conditioning. Parking provision
should be market-driven; developers should have flexibility in how much parking they provide,
and housing consumers should have a choice in how much parking they rent or buy.

Minimum parking requirements constrain new development
Minimum parking requirements are a constraint on new development in some areas. That
is, if requirements were lowered or eliminated, real estate developers could consequently reduce
the amount of parking they provide (Manville, 2013; McDonnell et al., 2011). A small body of
empirical research shows that parking requirements act as a binding constraint, in the context of
7

non-residential properties in metropolitan Los Angeles (Cutter & Franco, 2012), adaptive reuse
of commercial properties in downtown Los Angeles (Manville, 2013), new housing
developments in London (Li & Guo, 2014), and in New York City (McDonnell et al., 2011).
McDonnell and colleagues (2011), for example, compared the amount of parking required onsite with the amount that developers actually built in Queens, New York. They found that the
majority of real estate developers built at the minimum requirements or below (if they were able
to get a waiver).
Along with the direct effects of parking requirements, parking regulations also engender
several indirect adverse impacts. Studying New York City, Manville et al. (2013) found that a
ten percent increase in minimum parking requirements was associated with a five percent
increase in vehicle density, a five percent increase in vehicles per capita, six percent reductions
in population and housing densities, and a two percent reduction in transit commute share. High
parking requirements and bundled parking may even induce higher auto ownership (Manville,
(in press)).

Parking is associated with higher housing prices
Several city-specific studies provide empirical estimates of the effect of parking
provision on housing costs (Manville, 2013). Scholars have used multivariate techniques to
isolate the value of a parking space within the context of a larger bundle of housing attributes. Jia
and Wachs (1999) collected data on a sample of 232 property sales in San Francisco to test the
relationship between off-street parking and housing prices. They used a hedonic regression
model and found that the average single-family unit with off-street parking sold for 12% higher
and the average condo unit with off-street parking sold for 13% higher than the price of units
8

without parking. Manville (2013) studied a sample of buildings in downtown Los Angeles that
had been converted to housing after the city passed its Adaptive Reuse Ordinance, which
reduced parking requirements for these types of projects in and near downtown L.A. The author
regressed the natural log of price on bundled parking, bathroom, year of construction, and other
housing attributes. He found that an “apartment with bundled parking is associated with $200
more in asking rent, and bundled parking with a condo is associated with a $43,000 increase in
asking price” (Manville, 2013, p. 12). These articles provide some preliminary evidence
regarding the effect of bundled parking on housing prices, but are limited to selected
neighborhoods within single cities. Building on these studies, we draw on a national sample of
housing units and a more robust set of control variables to assess this relationship and provide
the evidence base for unbundling reform across U.S. cities.

Data
Data for this study are primarily derived from the 2011 American Housing Survey
(AHS), a biennial survey sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) and conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The AHS is unique because each survey
contains both a nationally representative sample of housing units, which are surveyed
consistently over time, and an over-sample of housing units from a rotating set of metropolitan
areas. The AHS provides weights to ensure that the total sample is representative of the national
housing stock, as well as replicate weights to account for variance in single survey estimates. In
all calculations reported in this analysis, we follow the guidance of the AHS codebook and
employ 160 replicate survey weights using the balanced repeated replicate (BRR) weights
command in Stata 13.
9

The AHS includes questions on topics including household socioeconomic
characteristics, physical housing quality attributes, housing costs and tenancy arrangements,
relocation behavior, neighborhood characteristics, and intra- and inter-metropolitan locations
(AHS, 2014). We restrict our sample to urban areas of U.S. Census Bureau defined metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) because there is sufficient demand for land in these areas to make the
space needed for parking very costly (Willson, 1995). In the 2011 AHS, more than 7% of all
housing units in urban areas do not have bundled parking, compared with less than 2% of all
housing units outside urban areas. Similarly, parking is rarely unbundled for homeowners (less
than 3%) and is much more prevalent for rental units (nearly 13%). Moreover, we further restrict
our sample to renters in urban areas because these households are experiencing the worst – and
worsening – housing cost burdens (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2015). Using the 2011 AHS
micro-data, we can analyze such 38,662 rental units, which are statistically representative of the
national urban, rental housing stock.
Our primary outcome of interest in this analysis is annual household rent. We measure
this using the variable RENT, which denotes how much is paid by a household at a given time,
and FRENT, which denotes the frequency of the rent payment (e.g. weekly, monthly etc.). The
RENT variable does not include parking costs if parking is “priced separately” (Econometrica,
Inc., 2013, p. 450). As described above, our analysis focuses on the relationship between parking
and rent. We focus specifically on garage parking because it is the most expensive type of
parking to construct, and the most prevalent form of parking in central, transit-oriented
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neighborhoods.1 Nationally, the construction cost of an above-ground structured parking space
averages $24,000 and an underground space averages $34,000 (Shoup, 2014). In the AHS, the
variable GARAGE indicates if one or more garage or carport parking spaces is included with the
unit rent, and these parking spaces may be located underground or above ground (Econometrica,
Inc., 2013). In the remainder of this paper, we refer to these garage and carport spaces as garage
spaces for simplicity’s sake.

Modeling approach
Our approach to modeling parking provision as a determinant of residential rents is based
on the conception of a housing unit as a heterogeneous bundle of attributes (Kain & Quigley,
1975). The price of a unit is a function of the components of this bundle, including a housing
unit’s size, attribute quality and locational characteristics (DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1996).
Hedonic regression models are commonly used to isolate the underlying equilibrium price for
each housing attribute (Allen, Springer, & Waller, 1995; Sirmans, Macpherson, & Zietz, 2005;
Witte, Sumka, & Erekson, 1979). The availability of on-site garage parking is one such factor in
a household’s housing purchase or rental decision, and it is the primary explanatory variable of
interest in this study. Economic theory does not specify the housing characteristics which should
be incorporated in a hedonic regression model (Edmonds, 1984; Sirmans et al., 2005). As such,
there is considerable variation in the explanatory variables other scholars have included in their
models. Categories of characteristics generally include structural quality, indoor amenities,
external features, natural environmental features, neighborhood and location, public services,

1

Surface parking, on the other hand, is generally provided in areas where the opportunity cost of not building
housing is lower.
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selling factors and financing issues (Sirmans et al., 2005). We selected variables based on a
combination of theory (Sirmans et al., 2005) and other hedonic model specifications using AHS
data (Downes & Zabel, 2002; Glaeser & Gyourko, 2003; Kiel & Zabel, 1997; Thibodeau, 1995).
In addition to the garage parking variable described above, we include unit characteristic
variables related to size and indoor amenities. A bedrooms variable reflects the number of full
bedrooms in a housing unit, and a bathrooms variable captures the number of full bathrooms in
the unit. These are two of the most commonly used variables in hedonic models (Sirmans et al.,
2005). We expect each additional bedroom and bathroom to add to the rental price. We use four
indicator variables representing common apartment amenities that represent unit quality: central
air-conditioning, a dishwasher, in-unit laundry, and a fireplace. We also include a variable
representing building age, measured by the number of years since the building was constructed.
We expect units in newer buildings to be more expensive. Because the relationship between
building age and price is generally non-linear due to depreciation and vintage effects (Goodman
& Thibodeau, 1995), we also include building age squared in our models.
A drawback of recent changes in the AHS public use file is the lack of variables with
which to measure neighborhood characteristics (Kiel & Zabel, 1997). Ideally we would include a
measure of neighborhood housing density, but since that is unavailable in the public use file, we
use the height of the building as a proxy for neighborhood density. That is, we expect that a unit
in a 20-story building is more likely to be in a denser neighborhood than a unit in a 2-story
building, and we expect higher rents in more dense areas due to the cost of land. For
neighborhood quality, we follow Thibodeau (1995) and use respondents’ self-reported
neighborhood opinion rating. Like Glaeser and Gyourko (2003), we add an indicator variable
reflecting Central City location to reflect relative location within a given metropolitan area.
12

Lastly, since we are using a national sample and there is great inter-metropolitan variation in the
built environment and economic conditions, we control for metropolitan population density and
median income in 2010.2 We expect rents to be higher in denser and higher-income metropolitan
areas.
We specify two hedonic regression models to isolate the relationship between garage
parking and rent, ceteris paribus. Again, we focus on the role of garage spaces because they are
more expensive to construct and are more likely to be built in urban areas with relatively high
land costs. Our hedonic regression models are shown in equations 1 and 2 below.

Equation 1

Rent=a+b1Garage Parkingi+b2Controlsi+ei

Equation 2

ln(Rent)=a+b1Garage Parkingi+b2Controlsi+ei

where the dependent variable is a household’s annual rent (Equation 1) or the natural log of
annual rent (Equation 2); garage parking is an indicator variable with a value of one if a housing
unit has at least one garage or carport parking space on-site included in the cost of rent; the
controls are a vector of neighborhood and metropolitan variables, and an error term expresses the
residual of each equation. As a robustness test to ensure that our results were not driven by

2

We aggregate county-level data from the 2010 American Community Survey to the 1980 standard metropolitan
statistical areas (SMSA) definitions used in the 2011 American Housing Survey.
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metropolitan level factors, we also ran the models with standard errors clustered by Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), of which there were 147 in the sample.
We use equations 1 and 2 to model the entire urban rental sample, a sub-sample of recent
movers, and a sub-sample of carless renters. We use the entire urban rental sample to estimate
the overall cost effects of garage parking across all rental units. We use the sub-sample of recent
movers as a robustness check because additional neighborhood quality variables are available for
housing units occupied by recent movers in the AHS.3 Lastly, we estimate the spending on
garage parking by carless renters. We use this last value to estimate the direct deadweight loss
borne by renters who do not have an automobile, but are nevertheless paying for a garage
parking space. We calculate deadweight loss by multiplying the coefficient for garage parking
from the carless renter sub-sample by the number of carless renters living in units with a garage
by the sample weight to make the estimate nationally representative.

Results
We first characterize bundled parking and vehicle ownership. We then report descriptive
statistics and bivariate correlations between annual rent and each individual unit characteristic,
neighborhood attribute, and metropolitan independent variable. Finally, we present the results of
the hedonic regression models.

3

Specifically, the survey asks new movers whether they moved to their current residence because of the quality of
neighborhood factors including schools, public services, transit, and general appearance. Data on these additional
neighborhood variables is available for a limited set of urban rental households (n= 13,677). We include these
variables in the same model as above with a more limited sample.
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Bundled parking and renters without vehicles
A large majority (83%) of the units in the sample included some kind of parking on-site.
About 38% of rental units had garage parking while 45% of the units had surface or other nongarage parking spaces. About 17% of the urban rental units in the survey did not have a parking
space, and this ranged dramatically by metropolitan area. The New York City area had the
highest prevalence of units without parking (73%), contrasting sharply with Orange County,
California at the other extreme (1%). Across metros, there were approximately 3.5 million rental
units without parking. These units tended to be smaller, older and with fewer in-unit amenities
than units with bundled parking.
Most American households have at least one automobile; nationwide only about 7.1% of
rental households do not have a car (United States Census Bureau, 2011). As with bundled
parking, there is considerable inter-metropolitan variation in the share of households without a
vehicle, from 26% in metropolitan New York City to 1.5% in the St. George (Utah) metropolitan
area. Across the entire 2011 AHS sample – which includes renter and owner-occupied units –
more than 29% of households without a car do not live in a housing unit with a bundled parking
space, as opposed to less than 4% of households with a vehicle. Within our final sample of
renter-occupied units, these percentages are 27% and 7% respectively. Quantifying the
relationship between vehicle ownership and parking is important because carless households are
paying for something that they most likely do not need or want. For instance, studies find
evidence of substantial under-utilization of garage spaces in multi-family residential buildings
across multiple West Coast metropolitan areas (Cervero, Adkins, & Sullivan, 2010; Rowe, Bae,
& Shen, 2010; Willson, 2015). While resale or subleasing of spaces undoubtedly occurs, there is
little empirical evidence about its prevalence, or the degree to which households use their private
15

garage spaces for non-parking uses, like storage or a work space. Anecdotally, it seems that
storage is the most common non-parking use of a private garage (Arnold, Graesch, Ragazzini, &
Ochs, 2012; Consumer Reports, 2015). This practice is less likely in structured parking garages.
The prevalence and nature of alternative uses of parking space is worthy of future research, and
it would help us to refine estimates of deadweight loss.

The American rental housing stock
The average yearly rent in the sample was approximately $10,951, or $913/month, with a
standard deviation of $478.4 The amenities of air-conditioning, laundry and dishwashers were
each present in about half of the rental housing in the sample. Fireplaces were a feature of only
15% of the rental units. The mean rental unit had about two bedrooms and more than one
bathroom. The average unit was constructed nearly fifty years ago, but well into the post-war
period with ubiquitous parking requirements (Shoup, 2005). The average rental unit in the
sample was situated in a three-story building, reflecting a mix of single-family, low-rise
apartments and high-rise apartment building types. About 59% of rental units were in the central
city of their respective metropolitan areas; the rest were in core urban areas outside the central
city or in smaller suburban jurisdictions. The average renter in the survey assessed their
neighbourhood quality as an 8 on a 10 point scale, with 10 being the most favorable assessment.

4

All in 2011$. The AHS top-codes rental values at the 99.5th percentile, so we would expect these averages to be
marginally higher in the absence of top-coding. However, this does not represent a concern for the integrity of the
analysis, as we are most interested in parking’s effect on low- and moderate-cost rental housing, rather than the high
end of the rental market.
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Bivariate results
The bivariate correlations between each of the independent variables and annual rent
mostly show expected relationships (Table 1). Our primary variable of interest, garage parking,
is positively associated with unit rent. The variables for unit size and quality are all positively
associated with rent, with the exception of central air-conditioning, which has a very small
negative coefficient. Newer units are generally more expensive than older ones. Units in higherrise buildings tend to be less expensive, which may be capturing the difference between singlefamily and multi-family rental housing. Units in neighborhoods that are more highly rated by
residents are associated with higher rents. Lastly, units in denser and higher income metropolitan
areas tend to be more expensive, as expected.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

Hedonic regression results
Again, we use hedonic regression techniques to examine the relationship between garage
parking and housing rents while holding other unit, neighborhood, and metropolitan factors
constant. We report coefficients and robust standard errors for each of two model specifications
(Table 2). Model 1 coefficients can be interpreted in terms of the dollar value they comprise of
rent. A one-unit change in Model 2 coefficients is associated with 100 times the coefficient
percentage change in rent. In both models, the distribution of the dependent variable
approximates the normal curve.

[Insert Table 2 about here]
17

As shown in Table 1, the substantive results of the two specifications are quite similar.
The statistical significance and the direction of the relationship between the independent
variables and garage parking is identical across models, except for building height. The two
models, however, provide different information regarding the value of garage parking as a factor
in rental price. Model 1 shows that a parking garage spot costs about $1,700 per year, or $142
per month. Model 2 suggests that the addition of a parking space increases the price of rent by
around 17%. Both models show that the cost of a garage space represents a substantial share of a
household’s rent payment.5
In terms of importance in the model, metro effects of density and income have the
greatest impacts on prevailing rent prices, and building age is the most influential building
characteristic or unit characteristic. Building height – our proxy for density – is not significantly
associated with rent levels, but residents’ self-assessment of neighbourhood quality is associated
with higher monthly rent. Unit size – measured in terms of the number of bedrooms and
bathrooms – is positively associated with rents, as expected. The unit amenities of fireplaces and
dishwashers are also associated with higher rents, while the laundry and central air-conditioning
variables have no significant relationship with rent.
In a hedonic regression on the sub-sample of units occupied by carless renters (results not
shown), we find that garage parking costs an average of $621 a year or a 13% premium on their
rental price. We calculate the deadweight loss to society stemming from garage parking provided

5

The substantive result of our modelling was unchanged by employing a clustered standard error approach.
Although coefficients are reduced and confidence intervals are increased in this specification, the statistical
significance and sign of the relationships between individual attributes and rental value are consistent, including the
value of garage parking. This gives us further confidence that metropolitan level effects, although important, are not
driving the model results.
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by landlords to residents of 708,000 housing units who do not own a car. At a national level, this
deadweight loss amounts to $440 million paid for garage parking spaces unused by residents for
parking annually. This amount only represents the direct cost of parking requirements on lowincome renters, and does not account for the many indirect costs of parking provision (Shoup,
2005).6

Discussion
Our results support the economic logic that an apartment with garage parking, ceteris
paribus, will be more expensive than one with surface parking or no parking. This logic is rooted
in demand and supply side factors. On the demand side, garage parking spaces are a valuable
amenity for urban renters. Garage parking offers cover from the elements, which reduces
external wear to a vehicle, and guarantees convenience and time saved for the consumer. Garage
parking is particularly valuable in higher-density urban neighborhoods where on-street parking is
metered or difficult to procure. Carless households, and households who do not use their garage
for automobile parking, may still gain some utility from a garage by using it for storage or even
additional living space. This would be more likely for households with a private one or two-car
garage, rather than a household with a designated space in a shared parking structure or
underground parking garage.
On the supply side, the direct and indirect costs of parking provision are high, and these
costs are passed on to renters. Garage parking is expensive to build and its provision often
represents a substantial opportunity cost for a real estate developer. Above-ground parking also

6

We lack data on the prevalence of renters sub-leasing their parking spaces, but even if a small share of renters do
rent out their garage parking, the amount of wasted resources is substantial.
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represents an opportunity cost since land area is devoted to parking rather than leasable
residential or commercial space. We show that these direct and indirect costs are passed on to
consumers in the form of higher rents. Again, garage parking is associated with higher rents of
about $142 per month or a 17% premium for urban residents. When assessing the price of garage
parking, these figures are conservative because they include some carports, which would
presumably command a smaller price premium. Our study presents the first national findings
which quantify the relationship between parking and housing costs.
While the ubiquity of parking provision reflects a combination of misguided regulation
and household demand, the provision of parking supply without associated demand can only be
characterized as wasteful. We are concerned about the social equity dimensions of parking
provisions, and we quantify the extent of this loss nationally for urban renters. We find that there
is a large deadweight loss associated with renters paying for garage parking that they do not use
for car storage, which we estimate to be about $440 million dollars per year. Given that the
carless population in the U.S. is generally lower-income than the car-owning population, many
of the households involuntarily paying for garage parking are the ones that can least afford to do
so. In fact, we find that households which have a garage space but no car have only a little more
than half of the income ($24,000) of other households ($44,000). In the absence of paying for an
unused parking space, these rent outlays could be applied to renting a larger or better-located
unit, other consumer spending, or saving for a home purchase. The deadweight loss associated
with carless households has not been quantified previously in the literature.Future research can
further assess the indirect costs of bundled parking provision on households and society more
broadly.
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Our primary policy recommendation is for cities to ease or eliminate minimum parking
requirements in urban areas. This is a pressing recommendation because even if parking
requirements were relaxed today, as is being implemented in some cities, the housing stock is
durable and the housing supply take years to adjust to demand for new bundles of housing
attributes (DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1996). It would likely take a decade or two before consumers
could choose from a wider selection of housing options with unbundled parking. Reducing or
eliminating minimum parking requirements would have the biggest benefits to renters in higherdensity, centrally-located neighborhoods where garage parking is prevalent.
Our second policy recommendation, which supplements the first, is that cities allow or
encourage real estate developers to unbundle parking from new housing. Again, this
recommendation depends on reform of minimum parking standards. If minimum parking
standards are not reduced or eliminated, a developer would have little or no incentive to
unbundle parking because there would be an oversupply of parking that could not be rented, and
a developer would essentially pay for this. A combination of policies would allow real estate
developers to build with less parking, and then to use pricing to allocate the parking spaces that
are constructed however they see fit. Real estate developers could then better respond to demand
from consumers who are currently or prospectively carless. But, there are enough unanswered
questions about parking bundling to prevent us from recommending that cities require unbundled
parking, as has been the approach of San Francisco (City of San Francisco, 2013) and downtown
Cleveland (Willson, 2015). We need to learn more about how real estate developers price
unbundled parking, and the degree to which some parking-related costs could still be passed
along to those who do not rent a parking space. Relatedly, it would be useful to assess how
secondary markets for parking spaces in private structures would function most efficiently.
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Moreover, the potential regulatory barriers to such markets must be better understood, along with
measures taken to address legitimate security concerns that might arise from landlords or
building tenants to sharing parking spaces with non-tenants.
There are two potential limitations to our analysis. First, some of the price premium
associated with garage parking may be attributable to unobservable characteristics associated
with garage parking which are not captured in our model; this is an inherent limitation of a
hedonic modeling approach. To ensure that our estimate of parking cost was not overly sensitive
to our final model specification, we tested the inclusion of other collinear independent variables.
We did not find that the inclusion of these variables substantially lowered our estimate of garage
space price in the main model. Second, there are a limited number of exogenous neighborhood
attribute variables available for the entire sample due to limitations in reporting in the AHS
dataset. Consequently, in our main models, we use several proxies and self-reported variables to
represent neighborhood characteristics. In a smaller sub-sample of recent movers, we find that
only school quality is a significant factor in rental value and that the inclusion of other
neighborhood variables does not substantially alter the rent estimates from our more expansive
sample. Particularly, the estimated impact of garage parking on rental value is virtually identical
to the full sample. This gives us confidence that the inclusion of additional neighborhood
attributes would not substantially change our findings.

Conclusion
In this study, we examine the effects of bundled parking provision on metropolitan
residential rents. We focus on renters in urban areas because these households are experiencing
the worst housing cost burdens. Our findings provide the first nationally representative evidence
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that urban garage parking provision is very costly to renters. We provide further evidence that
minimum parking requirements are burdensome to renters and lead to societal waste. Carless
households, including many lower-income households, in neighborhoods where garage parking
is the norm are disproportionately affected. Eliminating minimum parking requirements in these
locations would allow the market to gradually meet the latent demand for housing options with
unbundled parking, would reduce the annual $440 million deadweight loss directly experienced
by urban renters without cars, and would partially remedy the perverse incentive for driving and
sprawling urban form that these requirements have induced over the past seventy-five years.

23

Acknowledgments
We thank the UCLA Ziman Center for Real Estate Howard and Irene Levine Program in
Housing and Social Responsibility for generously funding this research. We are grateful to
Randy Crane for many interesting discussions about the American Housing Survey and parking
policy. We also thank Donald Shoup, Michael Manville, and attendees of the 2015 Association
of Collegiate Schools of Planning conference for their insightful comments on previous versions
of this study.

24

References

Allen, M. T., Springer, T. M., & Waller, N. G. (1995). Implicit pricing across residential rental
submarkets. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 11(2), 137–151.
http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01098658
Arnold, J. E., Graesch, A., Ragazzini, E., & Ochs, E. (2012). Life at home in the twenty-first
century: 32 families open their doors. Cotsen Institute of Archaeology Press.
Cervero, R., Adkins, A., & Sullivan, C. (2010). Are suburban TODs over-parked? Journal of
Public Transportation, 13(2). http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2375-0901.13.2.3
Chester, M., Fraser, A., Matute, J., Flower, C., & Pendyala, R. (2015). Parking Infrastructure: A
Constraint on or Opportunity for Urban Redevelopment? A Study of Los Angeles County
Parking Supply and Growth. Journal of the American Planning Association, 81(4), 268–
286. http://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2015.1092879
City of Los Angeles. (2013). Cornfield Arroyo Seco specific plan. Los Angeles Department of
City Planning.
City of San Francisco. (2013, September 6). San Francisco Planning Code. City of San
Francisco. Retrieved from
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:san
francisco_ca
Consumer Reports. (2015, June 11). 10 ways to take back your garage: How to stash your stuff
and have room for your cars, too. Consumer Reports. Retrieved from
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2015/05/10-ways-to-take-back-yourgarage/index.htm
25

Cutter, W. B., & Franco, S. F. (2012). Do parking requirements significantly increase the area
dedicated to parking? A test of the effect of parking requirements values in Los Angeles
County. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 46(6), 901–925.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2012.02.012
Deakin, E. (1989). Growth controls and growth management: A summary and review of
empirical research. In Understanding growth management: Critical issues and a research
agenda. Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute.
DiPasquale, D., & Wheaton, W. C. (1996). Urban economics and real estate markets.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall.
Downes, T. A., & Zabel, J. E. (2002). The impact of school characteristics on house prices:
Chicago 1987–1991. Journal of Urban Economics, 52(1), 1–25.
Econometrica, Inc. (2013). Codebook for the American Housing Survey, Public Use File, 19972011. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, Office of
Policy Development. Retrieved from
http://www.huduser.org/datasets/ahs/AHS_Codebook.pdf
Edmonds, R. G. (1984). A theoretical basis for hedonic regression: A research primer. Real
Estate Economics, 12(1), 72–85.
Farris, J. T. (2001). The barriers to using urban infill development to achieve smart growth.
Housing Policy Debate, 12(1), 1–30. http://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2001.9521395
Gabbe, C. J. (2016). Why are regulations adopted and what do they do? An analysis of land use
regulation near major transit in Los Angeles (Doctoral Dissertation). University of
California, Los Angeles.

26

Glaeser, E. L., & Gyourko, J. (2003). The impact of building restrictions on housing
affordability. New York, N.Y: FRBNY Economic Policy Review. Retrieved from
http://app.ny.frb.org/research/epr/03v09n2/0306glae.pdf
Glaeser, E. L., Gyourko, J., & Saks, R. (2005). Why have housing prices gone up? (Working
Paper No. 11129). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved
from http://www.nber.org/papers/w11129
Goodman, A. C., & Thibodeau, T. G. (1995). Age-related heteroskedasticity in hedonic house
price equations. Journal of Housing Research, 6(1), 25–42.
Jia, W., & Wachs, M. (1999). Parking Requirements and Housing Affordability: Case Study of
San Francisco. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research
Board, 1685(-1), 156–160. http://doi.org/10.3141/1685-20
Joint Center for Housing Studies. (2015). The State of the Nation’s Housing 2015. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University. Retrieved from
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/state_nations_housing
Kain, J. F., & Quigley, J. M. (1975). Housing Markets and Racial Discrimination: A
Microeconomic Analysis. NBER. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/books/kain75-1
Kennedy, P. (1995). An Infill Developer Versus the Force of No. Urban Ecologist, (2).
Kiel, K. A., & Zabel, J. E. (1997). Evaluating the usefulness of the American housing survey for
creating house price indices. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 14(12), 189–202.
Landis, J. D., Hood, H., Li, G., Rogers, T., & Warren, C. (2006). The future of infill housing in
California: Opportunities, potential, and feasibility. Housing Policy Debate, 17(4), 681–
725. http://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2006.9521587
27

Levine, N. (1999). The effects of local growth controls on regional housing production and
population redistribution in California. Urban Studies, 36(12), 2047–2068.
http://doi.org/10.1080/0042098992539
Li, F., & Guo, Z. (2014). Do parking standards matter? Evaluating the London parking reform
with a matched-pair approach. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 67,
352–365. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2014.08.001
Manville, M. ((in press)). Bundled parking and vehicle ownership: Evidence from the American
Housing Survey. Journal of Transport and Land Use.
Manville, M. (2013). Parking requirements and housing development. Journal of the American
Planning Association, 79(1), 49–66. http://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2013.785346
Manville, M., Beata, A., & Shoup, D. (2013). Turning housing into driving: Parking
requirements and density in Los Angeles and New York. Housing Policy Debate, 23(2),
350–375. http://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2013.767851
McDonnell, S., Madar, J., & Been, V. (2011). Minimum parking requirements and housing
affordability in New York City. Housing Policy Debate, 21(1), 45–68.
http://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2011.534386
Millard-Ball, A. (2002). Putting on their parking caps. Planning. April, 2002, 16–21.
Quigley, J. M., & Raphael, S. (2005). Regulation and the high cost of housing in California. The
American Economic Review, 95(2), 323–328.
Rowe, D. H., Bae, C.-H. C., & Shen, Q. (2010). Assessing multifamily residential parking
demand and transit service. ITE Journal, 80(12). Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/openview/4524c5e0680c7f4c8dc0c903e8361471/1?pqorigsite=gscholar
28

Shoup, D. (2005). The High Cost of Free Parking. Chicago, IL: Planners Press, American
Planning Association.
Shoup, D. (2014). The High Cost of Minimum Parking Requirements. In C. Mulley & S. Ison
(Eds.), Parking: Issues and Policies (pp. 87–113). Emerald Group Publishing.
Sirmans, S., Macpherson, D., & Zietz, E. (2005). The Composition of Hedonic Pricing Models.
Journal of Real Estate Literature, 13(1), 1–44.
http://doi.org/10.5555/reli.13.1.j03673877172w0w2
Thibodeau, T. G. (1995). House price indices from the 1984-1992 MSA American housing
surveys. Journal of Housing Research, 6, 439–482.
United States Census Bureau. (2011). 2011 American Community Survey 1-year estimates.
Willson, R. W. (1995). Suburban Parking Requirements: A Tacit Policy for Automobile Use and
Sprawl. Journal of the American Planning Association, 61(1), 29–42.
http://doi.org/10.1080/01944369508975617
Willson, R. W. (2015). Parking management for smart growth. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Retrieved from
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=k7fkCQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR2&d
q=Parking+Management+for+Smart+Growth&ots=BRjBxlZqeL&sig=Wbf9KNIbi0ApY_DfNzsHziBowA
Witte, A. D., Sumka, H. J., & Erekson, H. (1979). An estimate of a structural hedonic price
model of the housing market: an application of Rosen’s theory of implicit markets.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1151–1173.

29

Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations

Variable

Average

Correlation to yearly rent

$10,951

NA

Outcome of interest
Annual rent
Parking characteristics
Garage parking space(s)

38%

0.37***

Number of bedrooms

1.95

0.27***

Number of full bathrooms

1.25

0.37***

Central air-conditioning

50%

-0.01*

Fireplace

15%

0.29***

Dishwasher

50%

0.30***

Laundry

47%

0.17***

49

0.09***

Other unit and building characteristics

Age of building (years)
Neighborhood characteristics

30

Number of floors in building

3.0

-0.04***

7.56

0.12***

59%

-0.06***

1,907

0.22***

$58,079

0.43***

Self-assessed neighbourhood rating (110, 10 being highest)
Location in central city of metropolitan
area
Metropolitan area characteristics
Population density (persons/square
mile
Median income

* p-value <.10, ** p-value <.05, *** p-value <.01

Table 1: Hedonic regression results on annual rent

Variable Name

Model 1:

Model 2:

Coefficient

Coefficient

(robust

(robust standard

standard error)

error)

$1699***

.17***

(95)

(.01)

Parking characteristics

Garage parking

31

Other unit and building characteristics

Number of bedrooms

Number of bathrooms

Central air-conditioning

Fireplace

Dishwasher

Laundry

Building age

Building age squared

739***

.06***

(87)

(.01)

1811***

.14***

(290)

(.02)

-156

-.02

(111)

(.01)

950***

.07***

(150)

(.01)

2097***

.24***

(118)

(.01)

-76

-.01

(106)

(.01)

-50***

-.005***

(8.39)

(.001)

.56***

.000***

(.08)

(.000)

41

-.01**

(26)

(.002)

227***

.02***

(21)

(.002)

80

-.01

(88)

(.01)

Neighborhood characteristics

Number of floors in building

Self-assessed neighbourhood rating (110, 10 being highest)

Location in central city of metropolitan
area

32

Metropolitan area characteristics

Population density (persons/sq km)

Median income (000)

Constant

Model statistics

643***

.06***

(30)

(.002)

168***

.02***

(5.1)

(.000)

-6589

7.69

(512)

(.05)

N=38,662

N=38,662

Prob>F= 0.000

Prob>F= 0.000

Adjusted R-

Adjusted R-

Squared=0.34

Squared=0.28
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